Can we have an agent for…

content discovery?

Content-discovery agents are basically asking "can we kill the Twitter timeline?" The answer keeps being "not yet".

1 roast so far. Verdict mix below.

Verdict distribution

ALREADY EXISTS, YOU'RE LATE
0 · 0%
EMBARRASSINGLY EASY TO BUILD
0 · 0%
ACTUALLY NOT BAD
1 · 100%
GENUINELY BRILLIANT
0 · 0%
SHUT UP AND TAKE MY MONEY
0 · 0%

Sample content discovery verdict

PlanMaster 9000 (aka RFC-to-PLAN.md Whisperer)ACTUALLY NOT BAD
“You've drawn a prettier architecture diagram than most YC companies ship — now survive the multi-repo context window.”

Ship it anyway →Build the postmortem + ADR retrieval layer first and only — sell 'your org's memory injected into every plan' as the SKU. Nobody else is indexing Confluence postmortems.

Agent-Readiness Score

Build only if you have a moat. PlanMaster 9000 (aka RFC-to-PLAN.md Whisperer)'s readiness gap is real work.

51BAND D
  • Memory ↗19/25

    Some cross-session state — start with Redis, graduate to a vector store.

  • Tools ↗7/25

    Crowded market: at least 9 integrations to compete.

  • Policy ↗9/25

    Wide policy surface — full red-team pass, content filter, and human-in-loop required.

  • Evals ↗16/25

    Eval scaffolding doable — write 50 paired examples and grade with an LLM-as-judge.

↓ Download policy YAMLOpen in Managed Agents →Clone in Cursor

DETERMINISTIC SCORE — DERIVED FROM EXISTING ANALYSIS, NO SECOND LLM CALL

OWASP-MCP risk profile

Which OWASP Agentic/MCP Top-10 risks content discovery agent ideas tend to carry, across the 1 real idea roasted here. Derived deterministically from each idea's analysis — not a generic checklist.

MCP-2Cross-server prompt injection100% · 1/1

A second MCP server's output reaches the agent's context and steers it. Mitigation: source-tag every tool result, refuse cross-server instructions.

MCP-3Excessive agency100% · 1/1

The agent has more tool privileges than the user task requires. Mitigation: per-task capability scoping, explicit confirmation for destructive ops.

MCP-5Insecure tool composition100% · 1/1

Chaining tools enables an effect neither alone permits (read+exfiltrate). Mitigation: dataflow review, taint tracking, capability slicing.

Educational mapping based on the OWASP GenAI/MCP Top-10. Not a security audit of any specific product.

Best one-liner

“You've drawn a prettier architecture diagram than most YC companies ship — now survive the multi-repo context window.”
PlanMaster 9000 (aka RFC-to-PLAN.md Whisperer)ACTUALLY NOT BAD

Most-shared content discovery roasts

PlanMaster 9000 (aka RFC-to-PLAN.md Whisperer)

“I want build a code planner agent ,(basically a planner service, which does the agent orchestration). Input is RFC ,output is plan.md which is feeder for code implementation agent .”

You've drawn a prettier architecture diagram than most YC companies ship — now survive the multi-repo context window.

ACTUALLY NOT BAD

Who's already in this space

Devin (Cognition AI)active

End-to-end AI software engineer — does planning + implementation but treats the plan as internal, not an exportable artifact

GitHub Copilot Workspaceactive

Issue → plan → code pipeline inside GitHub, but no RFC ingestion, no ADR retrieval, no fan-out to downstream agents

Linear AIactive

AI-assisted issue decomposition and planning, but shallow — no codebase context, no PLAN.md artifact

Sweep AIreduced_activity

GitHub Issues → code PRs, skips structured planning artifact entirely, went quiet in 2024

Aideractive

CLI coding agent with repo map awareness — has the codebase retrieval piece but zero RFC/ADR/postmortem ingestion or planning phase

AutoPlan (defunct YC W23 stealth)dead

Tried RFC-to-sprint decomposition, pivoted to generic PM tooling, quietly died — the graveyard is real

Share this verdict

Got a different content discovery problem to roast?

Roast My Problem